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THE DILEMMA OF CHINA'S
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PIRACY
Jennifer S. Fan*
Prior to 1978, China had a political-command economy. Policies
emanated from the Chinese Communist Party and people were
expected to produce what the government demanded. However,
beginning in 1978, China, under Deng Xiaoping's leadership, started
to transform itself from a command-style economy to a socialistcapitalist one. To accomplish this goal, Deng Xiaoping used his
extensive personal power to make the government structure more
favorable to economic reforms, convincing a large number of
officials at all levels that reforms would be beneficial to
government
1
them.
Under this new economic regime, reform leaders purposely deemphasized Communist ideology to prevent a repeat of the political
turmoil that occurred during Mao Zedong's time. In December 1978,
this new era of economic reform was ushered in during the Third
Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the Chinese
Communist Party (Third Plenum) where China's shift from a solely
political-command economy to one that began to incorporate marketoriented elements gained official stature. In essence, the Party
envisioned that legal notions of economic rights would replace the
political-command system.

" Jennifer Fan holds a J.D. from the University of Pennsylvania (1998). She is currently an
associate at Cooley Godward LLP in San Francisco, California.
1 Harry Harding, Comment in SUSAN L. SHIRK, How CHINA OPENED ITS DOOR: THE
POLITICAL SUCCESS OF THE PRC's FOREIGN TRADE AND INVESTMENT REFORMS 99 (1994).
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In the end, Deng Xiaoping's reforms dramatically transformed
China's economy. Currently,
China's economy is the most dynamic of any size in the world.
With a population of 1.1 billion, an average annual gross domestic
product growth rate of seven percent over the last fourteen years, an
abundance of low-cost labor, natural resources and space, and its
proximity to other booming markets in East and Southeast Asia, the

PRC is an attractive target for firms seeking to open new markets.
For example, from 1979 to 1982, the amount of money committed
for investment in China by U.S. companies totaled $2.81 million.2
By 1995, U.S. investment in China had increased to $7.471 billion.
In addition, because "Chinese leaders now view foreign trade and
investment as required instruments for the advancement of political,
social, and economic goals and necessary for the creation of a strong,
modem, industrial China," 3 the intellectual property laws were
introduced as a means to complement the laws already in effect to
further encourage economic growth by attracting foreign investment.
Traditionally, intellectual property has been divided into three
categories: copyrights, patents, and trademarks. A copyright is "the
exclusive right held by the author or developer of an original work of
authorship to make copies of such work and utilize them for
commercial purposes." 4 Literary works, audiovisual works, computer
software, graphic works, musical arrangements, and sound recordings
are included among those works that receive copyright status in the
U.S. and other countries. 5 A patent is described as a "right of
protection granted to an inventor which can be used to exclude others
from manufacturing, selling or using his or her invention as it is

2

Mark C. Lewis, Contract Law in the People's Republic of China--Rule or Took Can the

PRC's Foreign Economic ContractLaw Be Administered According to the Rule of Law?, 30
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 495, 497-98 (1997).
3 Gary J. Demelle, Direct Foreign Investment and ContractualRelations in the People's
Republic of China,6 DEPAuL Bus. L. J. 331, 332 (1994).
4 Stephen R. Elias, NOLO's INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW DICTIONARY 42 (Ralph Warner
ed., 1st ed. 1985).
s Id. at 43.
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specifically described in the patent." 6 A trademark is defined as "a
word, phrase, logo, or other graphic symbol used by a manufacturer or
merchant
to distinguish his or her line of products from the products of
7
others."
This paper analyzes the effectiveness of China's intellectual
property laws and what role they play in China's foreign trade and
investment. Part I gives an overview of the Chinese conception of
law, specifically as it applies to intellectual property, and how it
differs from that of the United States. In particular, Part I will explain
why the Chinese did not generate intellectual property laws of their
own. Part II discusses the rationale behind China's adoption of
intellectual property laws. Part III explains why China's intellectual
property laws have been inadequate, particularly with regard to
protecting the interests of U.S. companies. Part IV illustrates why
America's response to the piracy of intellectual property has been
largely ineffective. Part V discusses strides that China has made in the
intellectual property area, but also explains why those advancements
have fallen short of expectations. Finally, Part VI offers alternative
methods of achieving the goal of protection of intellectual property in
China.
I.

THE CHINESE CONCEPTION OF LAW

It may be surprising to learn that China has a history of preventing
unauthorized reproduction of texts and other items. According to
noted Chinese law scholar William P. Alford, Director of Harvard
Law School's East Asian Legal Studies Program,
There is evidence preceding the establishment of the Zhou dynasty
in 1122 B.C. of interest in the ways in which commodities were
identified, concern from the Qin with the distribution of written
materials and attention from the Han (206 B.C.-A.D. 220) to
6 Id. at 146.
7 Id.at 107.
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barring the unauthorized reproduction of the classics. Nonetheless,

it is with the advent of printing during the Tang that one first finds
substantial,

sustained

8

efforts

to

regulate

publication

and

republication.

During the Tang period, the Wenzong Emperor issued an edict in
A.D. 835 to "prohibit[ ] the unauthorized reproduction by persons of
calendars, almanacs, and related

items, which ...

were being

reproduced in great quantity in the Southwest and distributed
throughout China."9
During the Song dynasty (A.D. 960-1279), the Zhencong Emperor,
who was concerned about the accessibility of undesirable printed
materials, required private printers to submit works they would
publish to local officials for review and registration.' 0 The subsequent
dynasties of the Ming (1368-1644) I Iand Qing continued to strengthen
the state's control over publication.
As in the East, restrictions were placed on the unauthorized
copying of books in the West as well. "In both the common and civil
law worlds, the idea of limiting the unauthorized copying of books
first arose ... from the crown's desire to provide printers with an

12
incentive not to publish heterodox materials."'
With the advent of the 17th and 18th centuries, however, the idea
evolved in Europe that "authors, inventors and other innovators had a
property interest in their creations that could be defended against the
state." 3 No such counterpart notion of intellectual property arose in
imperial China.
One rationale for the Chinese response towards intellectual
property issues can be explained through societal expectation. "Simply
stated, the need to interact with the past curtailed sharply the extent to

' William P. Alford, Don't Stop Thinking About ... Yesterday: Why There Was No
Indigenous Counterpartto IntellectualProperty Law in Imperial China, 7 J. CHINESE L. 3, 11-

12 (1993).
9 Id. at 12.
'0 Id. at 12-13.
" Id. at 14.
12 Id. at 18.
13 Id.
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which it was proper for anyone other than persons acting in a fiduciary
capacity to restrict access to its expressions.' 4
A.

Post-CulturalRevolution: The Reform Era

It was not until the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution, (1966that creating laws and regulations became a priority for the
government of the People's Republic of China (PRC). When
economic reform began in 1978, legal institutions were, for all
practical purposes, non-existent. 16 With the advent of the Four
Modernizations in 1978,17 the overarching policy goal was to
transform China "into a powerful Socialist State before the end of the
century."' 18 The growth of rule-based systems in China is not,
however, without controversy. Among China's elite, there continues
9
to be much debate over the proper role of the rule of law.'
76) 15

14

Id. at 29.

15 The Cultural Revolution has been described as "a period of radical attack and rejection
not just of lawyers and particular laws, but of all positive law and those responsible for it. The
slogan was, 'Smash the police, the procuracy, and the judiciary."' Lucie Cheng & Arthur
Rosett, Contract With a Chinese Face: Socially Embedded Factors in the Transformation
from Hierarchy to Market, 1978-1989, 5 J. CHINESE L. 143, 196 (1991).
16 See David Zweig et al., Law, Contractsand Economic Modernization: Lessons
from the
Recent Chinese RuralReforms, 23 STAN. J. INT'L L. 319, 324 (1987).
17 The term "Four Modernizations" was developed during the Third Plenary Session of the
1 th Chinese Communist Party Central Committee. Specifically, the four modernizations
referred to the modernization of agriculture, industry, national defense and science and
technology. See Liang Hsueh-ch'u, China's Economic Planfor a New Era of Development,
11 CHINESE L. & GOV'T 98, 104 (1978).
18 Id.
19 See Zweig et al., supra note 16.
That ultimate power in the P.R.C. rests in the hands of the C.C.P. further
informs the Chinese conception of the "rule of law." The 1982 Constitution of
the P.R.C. strengthened institutions of state government, but the Party's
Politburo still sets the broad policy behind the state plan; the State Planning
Commission concludes the details. At every level, equivalent Party and state
bureaucracies must interact to guarantee the implementation and eventual
fulfillment of the state plan.
Id. at 325 (citation omitted).
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B.

The Constitutionand Confucianism

In examining Chinese law, one can easily discern that the
emphasis is not on the individual, but on the state. 20 According to the
Constitution of China, individual rights are not divine, nor are they
irrevocable. 2 1 Specifically:
All persons holding the nationality of the People's Republic of

China are citizens of the People's Republic of China. All citizens
of the People's Republic of China are equal before the law. Every
citizen enjoys the rights and at the same time must
22 perform the
duties prescribed by the Constitution and by the law.

Unlike the U.S., China emphasizes performing one's duty to one's
country. 23 Further, Confucian norms advocate dispute resolution rather
than the adversarial system of litigation that most Americans are
familiar with.24 Confucianism also does not recognize the value of
protecting intellectual property as private rights.
[T]he responsibility of senior members of relationships for the
nurturing of their juniors--together with the fact that reference to the
past, far more than public, positive law or religion, defined the
limits of proper behavior in what were, after all, unequal
relationships-demanded more controlled access. Both functions,
however, militated against 2thinking
of the fruits of intellectual
5
endeavor as private property.

Unlike Western societies, Asian countries tend to place the good and protection of the
larger society over those of the individual. See Jeffrey J. Blatt, Asian Tech Transfers on the
Rise, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 14, 1994, at Cl.
21 XiANFA art. 2 (1993).
20

22 Id. art. 33.
2 "Laws which create a 'rights consciousness' challenge fundamental notions of the
individual's subservience to state authority. The specter of a litigious citizenry, armed with
knowledge of its legal rights and willing to confront those who govern them, might be
profoundly threatening to local Chinese leaders." Cheng & Rosett, supra note 15.
24 See generally Donald C. Clarke, Dispute Resolution in China, 5 J. CHINESE L. 245
(1991).

25 WILLIAM P. ALFORD, To STEAL A BOOK IS AN ELEGANT OFFENSE: INTELLECTUAL
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In sum, because individual rights have not been traditionally
protected in China, the idea of intellectual property rights safeguarding
an individual's or entity's idea, invention, or the like is unsurprisingly
foreign to the average Chinese citizen.
I.

A.

EXPLAINING THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAWS

China'sIntellectualPropertyLaws

Despite earlier Chinese misgivings about intellectual property
laws, China eventually found them necessary to advance its economic
goals. Currently, China is the second largest recipient of foreign direct
investment (FDI) after the United States. 26 Since FDI has played an
integral part in China's rapid economic growth, and since China plans
to sustain its annual 8% growth rate,27 China promulgated intellectual
property laws. In essence, China's leadership realized that, in order to
attract more foreign trade and investment, foreign businesses required
transparency in laws and assurances that their rights would be
protected. Arguably, China has developed new bodies of laws, such
as the intellectual property laws, to become a more active participant
in an increasingly international economic world which is marketoriented, and as such, requires rule-based systems.
China's early reform era attempts at preserving intellectual
property rights arose in several ways. Using international standards,
such as the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property (TRIPs) as a starting point, China began to craft its
intellectual property laws. However, China's intellectual property
laws did not conform entirely to international standards--they
preserved Chinese elements as well. For example, the Trademark Law
of 1982 was intended to protect "the right to exclusive use of
PROPERTY LAW IN CHINESE CIVILIZATION 20 (1995).

26 Wayne M. Morrison, 91121: China-U.S. Trade Issues, CONG. RES. SERV. ISSUE BRIEF

FOR CONG., Mar.

27 See id.

12, 1998, at 6.
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trademark. ' '28 Specifically, the Trademark Law stated that the use of
an unauthorized trademark on the "same type of commodity or a
similar commodity 29 or an "unauthorized manufacture or sale of
another's registered trademark sign" 30 would constitute infringement.
Yet despite recognizing the need to open the economy through
implementing internationally accepted intellectual property laws, the
31
law also reflected a "continued mistrust of unbridled capitalism."
"[T]he Trademark Law was clearly a legislative compromise,
promoting 'the exclusive right to use a trademark' but at the same time
'protecting consumers' interests' and promoting the 'development of
socialist commodity economy."' 32 The Trademark Law and its
implementing regulations were amended in 1993 to come further into
the ambit of international standards. 33 Tensions remain, however,
because unlike the U.S., China does not require that the prior use of a
trademark be demonstrated when initially registering the trademark.34
Subsequently, China passed the Patent Law of 1984.35 Article 1 of
the Patent Law was enacted "to protect patent rights for inventionscreations, to encourage invention-creation, to foster the spreading and
application of inventions-creations, and to promote the development of
science and technology, for meeting the needs of the construction of
socialist modernization." 36 However, the Patent Law only protects the
works of foreigners if they first publish their work within Chinese
territory. 37 In 1992, in order to conform with the conditions provided

28 TRADEMARK LAW OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA OF AUGUST

in 2 P.R.C. L. FOR FOREIGN Bus.--Bus. REG.
TrademarkLaw].

(CCH)

23, 1982, translated.

11-500, at 2 (1993) [hereinafter

29 See id.
30 See id.

31 Michael N. Schlesinger, Note, A Sleeping Giant Awakens:
IntellectualPropero,Law in China, 9 J. CHINESE L. 93, 101 (1995).

The Development of

32 Id.

31 See id.
34 TrademarkLaw, supra note 28, at art. 18.
35 Patent Law of the People's Republic of China, STANDING COMM. OF SIXTH NAT'L
PEOPLE'S CONG., art. 1 (4th Sess., Mar. 12, 1984), translatedin 2 CHINA LAWS FOR FOREIGN
BUs.-CHINA TRADE Docs. (CCH) 11-600, at 2 (1993) [hereinafter PatentLaw].
36 id.
37 Jill Chiang Fung, Note & Comment, Can Mickey Mouse Prevail in the Court of the
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for in a Memorandum of Understanding between the U.S. and China
on intellectual property and to bring China into compliance with the
TRIPs agreement, China amended the Patent Law and enacted new
implementing regulations for it.38 Currently, out of China's intellectual
property laws, the Patent Law most closely follows 39TRIPs
requirements, as any deviations from them are relatively minor.
Lastly, under China's Copyright Law, the works of foreigners are
protected in accordance with the guidelines of the Beme Convention.4 °
Indeed, the language used to describe the objectives of the Copyright
Law parallels that used in the TRIPs Agreement, which incorporates
the minimum standard of the Beme Convention and its Appendix. 41 In
addition, because China's Copyright Law largely conforms to TRIPs,
it theoretically also provides protection for those who own computer
programs, literary works, and other creative property. 42 However,
China's Copyright Law also promotes socialist ideals. Article 1 of the
Copyright Law states that the law's purpose is to "encourag[e] the
creation and dissemination of works which would contribute to the
building of an advanced socialist culture and ideology and socialist
material development, and ... [to] promot[e] the development and
flourishing of socialist culture and sciences." 43 It is in the area of
copyright that the international community would like to see greater
conformity to international standards. "The international community
has become particularly sensitive over the last several years to what is
perceived as the lack of enforcement of China's Copyright Laws,
particularly in cases of copyright infringement involving the piracy of
Monkey King?: Enforcing Foreign Intellectual Property Rights in the People's Republic of
China, 18 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COP. L.J. 613, 628 (1996).
38 See Schlesinger, supra note 31, at 108.
" See id.
40 COPYRIGHT LAW OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, Standing Comm. of the 7th Nat'l

People's Cong., art. 2 (15th Sess., Sept. 7, 1990), reprinted in 11 EuR. INTELL. PROP. REV. I
(Zhenlun Zhao trans. 1990) [hereinafter CopyrightLaw 1].
41 See Reiko R. Feaver, China's Copyright Law and the TRIPS Agreement, 5 J.
TRA SNAT'L L. & POL'Y 431, 437 (1996).
42 Fung, supra note 37, at 631.
43 COPYRIGHT LAW OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, adopted by Standing Comm., 7th

Nat'l People's Cong. (15th Sess., Sept. 7, 1990), promulgated by Nat'l Copyright Admin.
(May 30, 1991), reprinted in Laws and Regulations (1991-1992), at 612 [hereinafter
CopyrightLaw Ill.
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compact discs and computer software." 44 Currently, a draft of a new
copyright law is being circulated for comment to address this
criticism.
B.

The U.S. Concern with Intellectual Property

While China struggles to conform with international standards for
intellectual property, intellectual property has become a prominent
issue in the United States. One explanation is the link forged between
intellectual property issues and the growth of our trade deficit during
the mid-1980s.4 5 This link was initially raised by the intellectual
property-producing industries and later promulgated by the U.S.
government. Specifically, the argument was:
[T]he unlawful appropriation by others of our intellectual property
could in important measure explain our burgeoning trade deficit. If
only those making unauthorized use of our intellectual property
would instead pay retail for it, so this thinking went, the46revenues so
generated would in effect wipe out much of our deficit.

III.

A.

THE INADEQUACY OF CHINA'S INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
LAWS

An Overview

In order to
China realized
demands for
marketplace.

have an effective presence in the global marketplace,
that it would need to acquiesce to its trading partners'
intellectual property protection in the Chinese
As a result, China joined international conventions,

44 Schlesinger, supra note 31, at 119.
41 See William P. Alford, How Theory Does-and Does Not-Matter: American

Approaches to Intellectual Properly Law in East Asia, 13 UCLA PAC. BAsIN L.J. 8, 12

(1994).
46 See id.
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passed legislation protecting intellectual property, and created a court
system designed to address intellectual property problems.
However, while China has conducted several raids on intellectual
property infringers, and while its judicial decisions appear to indicate
China's commitment to preventing piracy of intellectual property,
47
enforcement of these laws has not been particularly successful.
Intellectual property piracy continues to cost U.S. companies hundreds
of millions of dollars each year.48
B.

Reasonsfor China's Violations ofIntellectual PropertyLaws

Since China is still considered a developing country, economically
it does not appear profitable for it to implement a successful
intellectual property regime.
Until China reaches a stage of
development similar to Taiwan's where "explosive economic
expansion, increasing awareness of the need for indigenous
technology, ever-more-pluralistic political and intellectual life,
growing commitment to formal legal processes, and international
aspirations" require intellectual property laws that are not in name
only, the U.S. will have to look at alternative methods to resolve their
intellectual property disputes with China.49
Currently, the economic forces in China are such that effective
intellectual property enforcement will make many products
unaffordable for the average Chinese.50 Further, in areas of China
where the piracy of intellectual property is particularly rampant, strict
enforcement of intellectual property rights of foreign countries, such
as the U.S., will make goods even more costly.5 ' The fact that the

47 Roberto Coloma, U.S. Says Patent Ripoffs Endanger China's GATT Changes, AGENCE
FRANcE PRESSE, Dec. 16, 1994, available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, China File.
48 Maggie Farley, US.-China Trade Talks Stall Over Copyrights, L.A. TnvMs, Dec. 17,
1994, at Dl.
49 ALFORD, supra note 25, at 108.
50 Arthur Wineburg, US. Threats Spur Asian Laws on Intellectual Property, NAT'L L.J.,
July 13, 1992, at 29.
51 Editorial, Forcing the Issue on Intellectual Piracy; Beqing Must Answer for China's
Failureto End Counterfeiting,L.A. TIMES, Oct. 11, 1995, at B8.
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Chinese government is a major user of pirated goods only makes the
problem more complicated. Some reports estimate that the use of
pirated U.S. software occurs in 90% of government offices. 52 The
government also produces a large portion of pirated goods, such as
CDs and video games. 53 The effect of piracy can be seen in terms of
cost--CD-ROMs that sold for $100 a year ago may be purchased for as
low as $6.50. 54 Moreover, the livelihood of people in some villages is
wholly dependent on the production of pirated goods. 55 The local
police are reluctant to 56
close down an illicit industry if it adversely
village.
entire
an
affects
China also resents that the U.S. boasts about its intellectual
property regime when, in the past, America was one of the most
notorious pirates of intellectual property. 57 Just as the U.S. did not
implement a successful intellectual property regime over a short
period of time, China believes that it should be given more flexibility
in establishing and enforcing its intellectual property laws. In sum,
until China sees that the protection of intellectual property rights
benefits its economic development, the U.S. and China will continue
to be caught58in the quagmire of trade disputes in which they now find
themselves.

52 Wineburg, supra note 50, at 21.
53 Amy Borrus et al., Counterfeit Disks, Suspect Enforcement: China's Feeble Piracy

Crackdown Puts Clinton in a Quandary,Bus. WK., Sept. 18, 1995, at 68.
54 id.
55 Maggie Farley & James Gerstenzang, China Piracy of U.S. Products Surges Despite
Accord, L.A. TnMES, Oct. 10, 1995, at Al.
56 1d; see generally, Zweig et al., supra note 16 (discussing the relationship between rural
and urban production of goods).
57 See generallyALFORD, supra note 25.
58 Y. Kurt Chang, Special 301 and Taiwan: A Case Study of Protecting United States
IntellectualProperty in Foreign Countries, 15 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 206, 214 (1994).
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IV.

A.

THE INEFFECTIVE RESPONSE OF THE UNITED STATES:
SPECIAL 301

The Purpose of Special 301

"From 1984 through 1994, the United States' yearly exports to
China rose from $3 billion to $8.8 billion whereas Chinese exports to
the U.S. rose from $3.1 billion to almost $38 billion."59 In light of the
lopsided trading totals, the U.S. decided to address the piracy concerns
of U.S. companies more forcefully. As a result, the U.S. Trade
Representative (USTR) pursued a course of action under the aegis of
Special 301, pursuant to the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act
of 1988.60 Under Special 301, the USTR generates several lists of
countries that fail to adequately protect intellectual property rights,
including the "priority foreign country" list, the "priority watch list,"
and the "watch list."6 ' Priority foreign countries are countries that
have committed glaring violations in the area of intellectual property,
whether it be in acts, policies, or practices. Further, these countries
have not entered into good faith negotiation or progressed in
negotiations with other countries. 62 Special 301 is implemented to
encourage trade partners to improve inadequate intellectual property
acts, enforcement, or policies. Countries on the priority watch list
have egregious acts, policies, or practices regarding intellectual
property, but they differ from priority foreign countries because they
continue to engage in good faith negotiations or are progressing

59 Kenyon S. Jenckes, Protection of Foreign Copyrights in China: The Intellectual
Property Courts and Alternative Avenues of Protection, 5 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 551, 564

(1997).
60 The Trade Act of 1974, amended by the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of
1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411-2487
(1988 & Supp. 1990)).

61 Judith H. Bello & Alan F. Holmer, "Special 301": Its Requirements, Implementation,
and Significance, 13 FoRD-lAM INT'L L.J. 259, 267 (1990).

62 19 U.S.C.A. § 2242(b)(1) (West Supp. 1995).

63 Kristie M. Kachuriak, Chinese Copyright Piracy:

Analysis of the Problem and

Suggestionsfor Protectionof U.S. Copyrights, 13 DICK. J.INT'L L. 599, 614 (1995).
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significantly in bilateral or multilateral negotiations. 64 Lastly,
countries on the watch list are monitored
because of existing problems
65
property.
intellectual
of
in the area
B.

How Special 301 Lists Are Generated

The Special 301 lists are created through consideration of several
factors. Specifically, the USTR uses data from the Register of
Copyrights, the Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks, and the
annual National Trade Estimates to compile the lists. 66 These lists are
subsequently released every spring. As required by Special 301, the
USTR releases the list within thirty days of the release of the National
6
Trade Estimates, 67 but can identify priority countries at any time.68
The USTR then has thirty days from the date of release to begin an
investigation into the intellectual property acts, policies, or practices of
those countries on the priority foreign countries list. 69 Under Special
301 guidelines, the USTR is allotted six months to complete the
investigation and to negotiate a solution to the intellectual property
problem. 70 If there is still unsatisfactory resolution of the problem, the
USTR may initiate several tactics for gaining compliance: (1) the
suspension of trade benefits; (2) the imposition of duties or other
restrictions; and (3) formation of a binding agreement which would
stipulate that the priority foreign country must cease onerous
intellectual property violations or adequately compensate the United
States. 7 1 Although Special 301 may seem appealing in theory, in

64 USTR Fact Sheets on Super 301 Trade Liberalization Priorities and Special 301 on
Intellectual Property, Released May 25, 1989, 6 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA), No. 22, at 715, 719
(May 31, 1989).
65 See generally Michael Yeh, Note, Up Against a Great Wall: The Fight
Against
Intellectual Property Piracy in China, 5 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 503 (1996) (discussing

Special 301).
66 19 U.S.C.A. § 2242(b)(2) (West Supp. 1995).
67

Id. § 2242(a).

68 Id. § 2242(c).

Id. § 2412(b)(2)(A).
Id. § 2414(a)(3)(A).
71 Kim Newby, The Effectiveness of Special 301 in Creating Long Term Copyright
69
70

The Dilemma of China'sIntellectualPropertyPiracy

221

reality the use of Special 301 has not been wildly successful from a
policy standpoint. In the case of China, the weaknesses of Special
301 are especially highlighted. Specifically, once the threat of
sanctions subsides, foreign countries are not motivated to change their
practices in the area of intellectual property, nor are they compelled to
enforce violations in the intellectual property realm. 73
C.

Why Special 301 Has Been Ineffective in China

China really only reacted to U.S. pressure about intellectual
property protection after the U.S. threatened to retaliate by imposing
trade sanctions under Special 301. In response to the threatened
sanctions, China signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)
with the United States. 74 Under the terms of the MOU, China was to
intensify its efforts to protect intellectual property. A bilateral trade
agreement was signed by China and the U.S. on January 16, 1992.
The terms of the agreement were such that China agreed to take
additional steps to prevent piracy in computer software and sound
recordings, to comply with guidelines set forth by two international
copyright conventions, and to provide greater protection for U.S.
producers of pharmaceutical and agricultural chemicals. 75 Thus, China
averted possible punitive tariffs that would have been imposed by the
U.S. had China failed to protect the intellectual property of U.S.
investors there.76
Once the prominence of the threat diminished, however, China did
not follow-through with the agreed-upon measures. Thus, China's
Protectionfor US. Companies Overseas,21 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 29, 38 (1995).
72 See Yeh, supra note 65 (discussing the effects the use of Special 301 has had for U.S.
interests in Taiwan and India); see also Intellectual Property: USTR Cites India, Taiwan,
Thailandas Worst IntellectualPropertyOffenders, 9 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA), No. 19, at 784

(May 6, 1992).
73 Nations Act on Intellectual-PropertyIssue, WALL ST. J., Apr. 23, 1993, at B 11.
74 Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of the P.R.C. and the
Government of the USA on the Protection of Intellectual Property, Jan. 17, 1992 (Dep't St.

Doc., onfile with the B.C. INT'L & Coa. L. REv.) [hereinafter MOUJ.

75 Eduardo Lachica, China Settles Dispute Over US. Patents, Copyrights, Heading Off
Tariff Threat, WALL ST. J., Jan. 17, 1992, at Al.
76 Id.
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intellectual property piracy continued. This stalled key 1994 trade
talks between China and the United States. 77 The U.S. argued that
China failed to meet the requirements of the bilateral agreement,
according to the terms of the MOU. On the other hand, China asserted
that the U.S. did not give China credit for the many advances it had
made during the twelve-year period since intellectual property laws
were promulgated.78 For example, the government raided 3,177 shops
that sold pirated products.79 It confiscated 1.9 million CDs, 752,000
80
audio and videotapes, 45,000 books, and 37,000 software programs.
Despite the stalemate in talks, China and the U.S. eventually
arrived at an arrangement. To avert a trade war, the two countries
signed the U.S.-China Intellectual Property Rights Agreement (the
Agreement) on February 4, 1995.81 The agreement, structured to
control China's8 2piracy problem, contained two parts: enforcement and
market access.
The enforcement provision included two systems to prevent
infringement in China. The first system was a "title verification
system that requires producers of CDs, LDs, and CD-ROMs to place
unique identifiers on all of their products."8 3 Thus, "only producers
with permission from the copyright holder will be able to reproduce
and export these products."84 The second system included enforcement
by administrative and judicial means.8 5 To prevent the problem of
"overlapping and unclear jurisdiction of various agencies," 86 the
Agreement established the following system: (1) a Working
Conference on Intellectual Property Rights, located in Beijing, would
provide oversight for the entire system; (2) on a local level, an inter-

77 Farley, supra note 48.
78

IntellectualProperty in China: Copy to Come, ECONOMIST, Jan. 7, 1995, at 51.

79 BorTus et al., supranote 53.

so Id.
s1 The agreement was signed on the same day on which $1.08 billion in U.S. retaliatory
tariffs were to come into effect. See id.
82 See id.
83 Jenckes, supra note 59, at 567.
84 Id.
8"

See id.

86

Id.
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ministry structure would be created; (3) the local conferences would
establish enforcement "Task Forces" to guarantee that administrative
action will take place; and (4) foreign right owners would be able to
have better access to enforcement of intellectual property
rights, with
87
resulting court penalties being enforced by the police.
Throughout the 20th century, the U.S. has responded to the
infringement of intellectual property in China "consistent[ly] and
unambiguous[ly].,, 88 "Essentially, the United States has treated the
question of respect for American intellectual property as a matter of
"89
'political will, not ability' on the part of the Chinese leaders ....
The U.S. and China also entered into a trade accord on February
27, 1995. This trade accord gave rise to renewed promises of an open
Chinese market, which would commit itself to intellectual property
protection for U.S. companies. 90 Moreover, China promised to take
additional measures to enforce existing laws with the help of the U.S.
Customs service in the technical realm. 91 Further, U.S. companies
would be allowed to establish entertainment production facilities in
92
several major Chinese cities, such as Shanghai and Guangzhou.
Under the new agreement, China would prevent trademark
infringement and government ministries' use of pirated computer
software.9 3 Lastly, greater access for holders of U.S. copyrights would
be instituted.94 The U.S., in turn, would not impose a planned $1
billion in trade sanctions on Chinese products marketed in the U.S.,
and would instead concentrate its efforts on appealing to the consumer

87

See id.

s William P. Alford, Making the World Safe For What? Intellectual Property Rights,
Human Rights and Foreign Economic Policy in the Post-European Cold War World, 29
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 135, 137 (1997).
89 Id.
90 James Gerstenzang & Rone Tempest, China PactLeaves Many Questions, L.A. TIMEs,
Feb. 27, 1995, at Al.
91 Id.
92 Id.

93Id.
94Id.
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consciousness of 1.2 billion Chinese citizens for the purchase of
accurately licensed items, such as CDs and computer software. 95
On April 30, 1996, the USTR again designated China as a priority
watch country under Special 301, stating that it had not complied with
the 1995 intellectual property agreement. Specifically, China had not
taken steps to close thirty factories that were still producing and
exporting pirated works. The USTR was prepared to impose
retaliatory sanctions on a published list of Chinese products. The
Chinese issued threats of their own. Finally, on June 17, 1996, the
USTR announced that China had begun to work towards fulfilling the
1995 agreement. The USTR stated that China had accomplished this
by closing fifteen CD factories; increasing the activities of the
Ministry of Public Security; taking steps to strengthen border
enforcement; and by placing a moratorium on the creation of any new
CD factories.
More recently, through the use of bilateral agreements, intellectual
property piracy has continued to decline. USTR Charlene Barshefsky
points to the following facts:
" China has closed fifty-eight CD and CD-ROM production lines
and has destroyed the masters and molds being used to produce
these products.
*

China has arrested more than 250 people for intellectual property
piracy and imposed prison sentences of up to seventeen years.

" China has seized more than six million CDs illegally smuggled
96
into China.
Thereafter, China was downgraded to "Section 306" status rather
than Special 301 status, which signified China's improvement of its
intellectual property protection, while highlighting the need for
95 Id.
96 Barshefsky Calls Bilateral Issues 'Critical' to China's Accession to WTO, 15 INT'L

TRADE REP. (BNA), No. 5, at 182 (Feb. 4, 1998).
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continued progress and enhanced enforcement measures. Thus, the
USTR continues to monitor the bilateral agreements concluded under
Section 301. Should such monitoring show that there is unsatisfactory
compliance with the agreement, the USTR may take97appropriate
action immediately without initiating a new investigation.
D.

How Special 301 Adversely Affects the TRIPs Agreement

Special 301 clearly fell short of effectively addressing ongoing
intellectual property problems in China. Instead, talks stopped and
restarted several times before any sort of agreement was reached. In
addition to the inadequacy of Special 301, the very existence of
Special 301 may threaten to circumvent progress made in the
international arena regarding the piracy of intellectual property. 98 The
Uruguay Round of negotiation of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT) established the World Trade Organization (WTO),
effective January 1, 1995. Under the umbrella of the WTO, the
protection of intellectual property was brought under the multilateral
system. 99 For the first time, an international standard for the protection
of intellectual property rights for all members of the WTO was
00
established and subsequently memorialized in the TRIPs agreement.1
Specifically, the TRIPs agreement covers, among other provisions:
" The protection of computer programs as literary works;
" Rental rights for computer programs and sound recordings;
97 See id.
98 The U.S. has been criticized because the USTR may still designate a country "for
Special 301 treatment notwithstanding its compliance with TRIPs." Intellectual Property:
GATT Bill Brings Major Reforms to Domestic Intellectual Property Law, 11 INT'L TRADE
REP. (BNA), No. 50, at 1966 (Dec. 21 1994).
99 The WTO: What It Is, What It Does, Focus (WTO, Geneva, Switz.), Jan.-Feb. 1995, at

4.
10oCarlos A. Primo Braga, Protection on a Global Scale, CHiNA Bus. REV., Mar.-Apr.
1995, at 25; Cf Marci A. Hamilton, The TRIPS Agreement: Imperialistic, Outdated and
Overprotective, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 613 (1996) (offering a different view of the
TRIPS agreement).
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Fifty years of copyright protection for sound recordings and
motion pictures;

"

" Product and process patent protection for virtually all types of
inventions; and
* Protection for trade secrets, integrated circuits, industrial designs,
and non-generic
geographical indications used to describe wines
101
spirits.
and
The protection of intellectual property in China, however, has yet
to benefit from this multilateral consensus, because China is still not a
member of the WTO. "[C]hina is negotiating with a multilateral
group of trading partners, including the United States, in an effort to
become a member of the World Trade Organization."' 0 2 China has
repeatedly conmitted intellectual property transgressions against the
United States. As a result, the U.S. is reluctant to support China's
accession to the WTO until China complies with WTO standards in
the intellectual property realm.
E.

Criticismsof the Use of Special 301

Professor William Alford argues that Section 301 contravenes the
United States' obligations to the WTO.10 3 More specifically, it "directs
the United States Trade Representative to take action against
infinging nations within a defined time period, even if the WTO's
administrative remedies have not yet run their course .... ,104 Thus, the
United States' approach to countering infringement of its intellectual

101Fact Sheet: Protection ofIntellectual PropertyRights, 5 U.S. DEP'T ST. DISPATCH 126
(1994).
102

Intellectual Property: U.S., ChinaAnnounce BroadAgreement on Intellectual Property

Protection, 12 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA), No. 9, at 401 (Mar. 1, 1995).
103 See Jenckes, supra note 59, at 566.

104 Id.
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property rights restricts market access that was already promised under
the WTO regime.
In addition, Professor Alford alleges that the figures provided by
American industries of approximate losses due to copyright piracy in
China may be wrong. 10 5 "These estimates are based on the assumption
that the loss due to piracy equaled the revenues that would have been
realized had the items in question been sold at full price."' 1 6 However,
Professor Alford claims there is no evidence that someone who buys a
pirated good for say, $3.00 would purchase
a legal copy at a higher
10 7
unavailable.
were
copies
illegal
if
price
Unilateral pressure by the U.S. outside of the WTO framework
may also irreparably harm U.S.-China relations. U.S. companies that
rely on Chinese imports but are unrelated to the intellectual property
industries would be adversely affected if a trade war began.
V.

A.

CHINA'S STRIDES IN THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ARENA

The Introduction of IntellectualPropertyRights

On the legal front, China has taken several judicial initiatives to
demonstrate its commitment to protecting the intellectual property
rights of foreign companies. 10 8 By doing so, the Chinese Communist
Party hopes to maintain goodwill among foreign investors who
contribute to the growth of China's economy. On August 5, 1993, at
both the Intermediate and Higher People's Court levels, Intellectual
Property Courts were established in Beijing. 1°9 Subsequently,
'0' See William P. Alford, Forum: Taiwan and the GATT: Panel Three: Intellectual
Property,Trade and Taiwan: A GATT-fly's View, 1992 COLUM. Bus. L. REV.97, 99 (1992).
106 Jenckes, supra note 59, at 566.
107 See id.
108 See Zheng Chengsi & Michael D. Pendleton, China's First Court Decision on
Copyright: Jiang v. Qiao and the Film 'Hospital Ward No. 16', 12 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV.
217 (1990) [hereinafter First Court Decision] ( an example of how copyright disputes were
settled prior to the implementation of China's Copyright Law).
109Gregory S.Kolton, CopyrightLaw and the People'sCourts in the People's Republic of
China: A Review and Critique of China's Intellectual Property Courts, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L
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Intellectual Property Courts were created in four other provinces and
municipalities." 0 "As of early 1995, sixteen intellectual property
divisions had been established, including three in Beijing, three in
Shanghai, five in Guangdong, two in Hainan, and one each in Fujian,
Xiamen and Dalian.""' Although the Intellectual Property Courts do
not differ in procedure from their counterparts in the Civil and
Economic Divisions of the Chinese court system, there are other
differences. 112 First, the plaintiff must post as bond between 0.5-3.0%
of the plaintiff's total claim at the inception of the case. 1 13 Second,
Intellectual Property Courts require that a "consularized Power of
Attorney" be signed at the beginning of the court proceedings. 114
The number of intellectual property cases heard annually remains
small in comparison to the total number of cases heard, for example,
in the economic divisions of the PRC's courts. 15 Beijing's Intellectual
Property Courts, as earlier noted established in August 1993, had
heard 125 cases and ruled on 87 by March 1994.116 Courts in Shanghai
and Xiamen, created in February 1994, handled more than six hundred
and forty-seven cases, respectively. 117 China's eighteen national
intellectual property courts in existence in August 1996 had by that
time heard 2,500 cases. 118 Even though these numbers remained
relatively small in the early years, the existence of intellectual property
divisions in the people's courts in China is "an unprecedented
development in the history of Chinese intellectual property law as it
indicates the resolve of the Chinese government to promote a shift
from non-judicial to judicial enforcement of intellectual property
I19
rights.""
EcoN. L. 415, 436 (1996).
110 Id.

1 See Schlesinger, supra note 31, at 120-21.
Kolton, supra note 109, at 437.
11 ild.
114 Id.
15 See Schlesinger, supra note 31, at 121.
112

116

Glenn R. Butterton, Pirates, Dragons and U.S. Intellectual Property Rights in China:

ProblemsandProspectsof Chinese Enforcement, 38 ARIz. L. RnV. 1081, 1119 (1996).
117

See id.

11 See id.
119 Schlesinger, supra note 31, at 121-22.
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Several significant cases regarding intellectual property disputes
have been heard by the Intellectual Property Courts since their
inception. By looking at several domestic and foreign copyright
infringement cases, one can gain a better understanding of the strides
that China has made on the intellectual property front.
The domestic case of China Golden Dawn Safety Technology Co.
v. Beijing Shijingshan District Zhiye Electronics Ltd., the first
computer software infringement case presided over by the Beijing
Intellectual Property Court, was reported on January 4, 1994, and
resulted in a victory for the plaintiff.120 In this case, the plaintiff, with
a PRC official, had purchased illegally copied China Golden Dawn
software from an employee of Beijing Shijingshan. 121 Pursuant to
Article 30 of the Computer Software Protection Regulations, 122 the
Beijing Intellectual Property Court awarded Rmb150,000 in
can by
damages.' 23 However, the successful outcome of this dispute
24
no means be considered indicative of all domestic disputes.1
The first foreign copyright infringement case was initiated in 1994
by Hong Kong's Broad Mind Computer Company (BMC) against
Beijing's Han Wei Electronic Engineering Company. Although BMC
tried to prove its case by introducing evidence in the form of catalogs,
invoices, and research and development notes, the court remained

See Case Digest: Local Software Developer Wins Rmb150,O00 Awardfor Infringement,
CHINA L. & PRAc., Apr. 11, 1994, at 19. Note that "Rmb" represents the Renminbi, the
Chinese unit of currency.
121 id.
12 Regulations on Computer Software Protection of the People's Republic of China,
translated in Henry H. Liu, Legislative Update-Legal Aspects of Software Protection in
120

China: The Computer Software ProtectionRegulations, 9 CoMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 469,

app. (1993) [hereinafter Software Regulations].
123 The court "awarded Rmb100,000 for economic loss, loss to reputation, court costs, and
legal fees, and awarded an additional Rmb5O,000 for any costs incurred in correcting the
effects of defendant's activities." Kolton, supra note 109, at 438.
124 Sun Tendy (China's premiere software company), for example, used the local
commerce bureau to enforce intellectual property rights instead of the Intellectual Property
Courts because of the lengthy court process. See China Computer Firm Seeks Piracy
Compensation, REUTER EUR. Bus. REP., Nov. 11, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Curmws File.
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unconvinced. 125 It is unclear whether more developments occurred in
this case after July 25, 1994.126
More recently, under the aegis of the 1992 U.S.-Sino MOU, a U.S.
enterprise, the Walt Disney Company, pursued litigation in China to
prevent further piracy of its internationally recognized cartoon
characters. Disney initiated its copyright infringement case in January
1995 against Beijing Youngsters and Children Publishing House and
World
Xinhua Bookshop's Beijing circulation department. 127 Great
28
Publishing Company was brought as a third-party defendant.1
Disney alleged in its suit that the Chinese publishing companies
had illegally produced and distributed children's books containing
pictures of well-known Disney characters. 129 Disney demanded
remedies including "an injunction, an accounting of profits, a public
apology, and the equivalent of US$77,000 in damages."'"3 On August
4, 1994, the Intellectual Property Court ruled that, pursuant to the
Copyright Law, the publisher and distributor were both liable for
copyright infringement.131 Subsequently, in May 1995, the Intellectual
Property Court deemed the retailer liable. 3 2 The Intellectual Property
Court ordered public apologies from the three defendants, 133 and a
stop to their illegal publishing activities.' 34 Although Disney did not
it
receive all of the monetary damages it requested, it received what 135
wanted the most--recognition that piracy of its goods was illegal.
125

at5.

A Being Court Hearsa Software Case: Testing Protection,Bus. CHINA, July 25, 1994,

128

Kolton, supra note 109, at n.154.
Id. at 442.
Id.

129

Susan Orenstein, Case Goes to New Being Court: Disney Duels with Chinese 'Pirates'

126
127

Over Mickey, LEGAL TIMEs, July 25, 1994, at 2.
130 Kolton, supra note 109, at 442.
131 Benjamin K. Lim, China Court Favours Disney in Key Copyright Suit, REuTER AsIAPAC. Bus. REP., Aug. 4, 1994, availablein LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File.
132 See Mickey Offered an Apology, FIN. TIMES, May 19, 1995, at 4; see also Chinese
Court Grants Disney Copyright Damages, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, May 18, 1995, available

in LEXIS, News Library, Cumws File (discussing the remedies granted to Disney).
133

134

Id.

Id.
In addition to judicial action, China's Copyright Law allows the imposition of
administrative penalties when copyright infringement occurs. Copyright Law, supra note 43,
133
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This simple recognition was a triumph in and of itself because it
demonstrated that China's Copyright Law had teeth.
B.

Why Enforcement is Still a Problem

Despite recent legal strides, the rule of law will become irrelevant
in China if not properly enforced beyond a few headline examples.
Although China has formed a body of relatively comprehensive
intellectual property laws, "[t]he Chinese government has conceded
that the short history of the country's intellectual property legal
system, the people's lack of knowledge of the issue, and enforcement
have seriously harmed economic
agencies' ignorance of the laws
136
owners."'
rights
interests of the
The experience of other foreign companies in China illustrates the
difficulties still encountered in protecting intellectual property rights.
For example, in 1992, Shenzhen Reflective Materials Institute of
Shenzhen University copied more than 650,000 of Microsoft
Corporation's trademark holograms without authorization. 137 After
two years, Microsoft received a mere 2,200 yuan (US$252) from a
decision by the Shenzhen Administration for Industry and
Commerce. 138 The lost sales for Microsoft have been approximated
between US$30 million and possibly as much as US$180 million. 139 In
addition, during the two years that Microsoft awaited the decision,
140
Microsoft alleged that the Institute continued to copy its holograms.
software sold under the name
Microsoft contended that 98% of the
141
counterfeit.
is
China
"Microsoft" in

art. 46.
136 Patrick H. Hu, "Mickey Mouse" in China: Legal and Cultural Implications in
ProtectingUS. Copyrights, 14 B.U. INT'LL.J. 81, 99 (1996).
137 Feaver, supra note 41, at 450.

138 See id.
139See Butterton, supra note 116, at 1099.
140 See Feaver, supra note 41, at n.132.
141See id.
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VI.

ALTERNATIVE METHODS OF PROTECTING INTELLECTUAL

PROPERTY

Clearly, many American items have been infringed upon even
since China has promulgated its intellectual property laws. Flagrant
violations include the production of fake IBM computer components,
Levi's jeans, Johnny Walker scotch, Heinz products, Nestle's baby
food, Mars confectioneries, Coca-Cola soft drinks, and Bass
footwear. 142 This is not to suggest that China has ceased taking steps
toward preventing piracy. Indeed, the fact that China is becoming
more cognizant of the need for stricter enforcement mechanisms is
evidenced, for example, by the passage of the 1994 "Resolution for
Imposing Criminal Penalties on Copyright Violators," which is aimed
at stopping egregious offenders of the copyright laws. 143 However,
while such efforts are admirable, further measures must be taken to
effectively combat the problem of piracy of intellectual property in
China. The following alternatives should be seriously considered.
A.

IntellectualPropertyEducation

First, an understanding of the importance of intellectual property
must be further developed in China. This will be difficult because
traditionally China, as a Communist country, does not embrace the
ideas of individual recognition, ownership, and profit. 144 But some
preliminary measures that may be taken include educating officials
regarding copyright issues, 145 continuing to fund intellectual property
departments at major PRC universities so that more Chinese and

142 ALFORD,

supra note 25, at 84.

143 This resolution was passed by the National People's Congress. Hu, supra note 136, at

99.
144

See Paul Steidlmeier & Cecilia Falbe, International Disputes Over Intellectual

Property,52 REv. Soc. ECON. 339, 349 (1994).
145 See Kolton, supra note 109, at 456.
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copyright laws, 146 and forming
foreigners can understand the Chinese
47
exchanges.1
intellectual property
The U.S. can play a substantial role in this process by providing
legal expertise and other resources to assist China in its efforts to
educate not only officials, but the masses as well. U.S. companies and
lawyers can offer knowledge in the form of, for example, mock
48
proceedings, seminars, and the aforementioned exchange programs.
Although these educational efforts may be costly, the long-term
benefits for U.S. companies in regards to establishing guanxi (loosely,
"friendly relations") and consumer goodwill will make them
worthwhile. 149
B.

An IncreasedRole for the IntellectualPropertyCourts

The Intellectual Property Courts must also take a more active role
in intellectual property enforcement. One way this can occur is by
publicizing recent intellectual property cases. 50 The courts should also
strive to educate judges and other officials about intellectual property,
and keep them abreast of new developments in this area of the law.151
The 1995 Intellectual Property Agreement between China and the
U.S., for example, specifically states that governmental officials,
enforcement personnel, must be
including administrative and judicial
152
trained in intellectual property law.

See id.
147 See id. at 457-58. For example, in August 1995, China established an exchange in
146

Xi'an-thereby allowing a place where different types of intellectual property can be bought
and sold according to legal guidelines. Id.
148 See Hu, supra note 136, at 111.
149 See id.
"So See id.at 110.

1 See id.
152 See id.
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C.

UnderstandingBoth American and Chinese Perspectives

The U.S. also must not try to impose its own view of the
importance of individualism on China. Rather, it should pursue a
course of action that is complementary to the Chinese way of thinking.
Cultural perceptions are difficult, if not impossible, to change, for
there are no objectively "right" or "wrong" answers in that particular
realm. The U.S. cannot superimpose its own vision of the world on
China, and neither can China convert America toward its Confucianimbued manner of thinking. Moreover, the U.S. must keep in mind
that the intellectual property laws in China are part of a broader,
ongoing effort to establish a formal legal system which would
legitimate China, and thereby differentiate China's current reformminded leadership from5 3its pre-Cultural Revolution and Cultural
Revolution predecessors. 1
D.

The Importance of Joint Ventures

As yet another angle for intellectual property enforcement, the
U.S. should consider participating in more joint ventures with Chinese
enterprises. In this manner, American companies would have local
assistance, and the Chinese partners would have a greater stake in the
investment. By having a vested interest, the Chinese enterprises could
conceivably exert increased pressure on the
government to ensure the
15 4
effective enforcement of anti-piracy laws.
E.

Using InternationalMechanisms: The WTO

Finally, the U.S. should support China's accession to the WTO. As
discussed earlier, unilateral Special 301 actions have not been
particularly successful in changing China's practices in the intellectual
153
154

See ALFORD, supra note 25, at 93.
Specifically, "a Chinese partner can facilitate immediate ... enforcement and also

minimize the risk of sacrificing business relationships and consumer goodwill." Hu, supra
note 136, at 109.
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property area. The diplomatic costs of reprimanding China for its
intellectual property transgressions under Special 301 will only serve
to sour Sino-U.S. relations. 155 As a member of the WTO, in contrast,
China would be required to follow TRIPs guidelines. And the WTO 1is
56
actually more flexible than Special 301 in several important ways.
First, a developing country has a five year phase-in time to meet
TRIPs requirements. 157 Second, moral sanctions under the WTO
regime can transpire at a multilateral level, even though authorized
enforcement actions occur bilaterally.1 58 In this context, the U.S. can
avoid the uncomfortable position of being the sole moral accuser of
inadequate Chinese enforcement of intellectual property rights. Third,
the reforms that the WTO would require of China, such as national
treatment and nondiscrimination, would lead to increased transparency
and trading rights. 159 Specifically, greater transparency of the law
would compel China to quickly publish all governmental regulations
influencing trade, such as those concerning intellectual property rights,
and make them available to foreign firms.
VII.

CONCLUSION

As trade is increasingly governed by the laws of international
economics, it is imperative that countries strive to accomplish the
goals set forth under these laws. 160 To this end, the U.S. and China

15 See Russell Cheetham, Why We Need China To Succeed, WALL ST. J. EUR., Sept. 5,

1995, at 6.

156 "Special 301 is not suited to fostering economic development, but it is an effective way

of expressing disapproval." Yeh, supra note 65, at 524.
117 See id. at n.82.
158 See id.
159 See id.

160 As Professor deLisle points out:
[E]conomic and commercial issues now dominate including: concerns about
the bilateral trade imbalance; questions of China's continued enjoyment of
Most-Favored Nation (MFN) status and the prospects for its entry into the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT1) and the World Trade
Organization (WTO); threats of trade sanctions in retaliation for China's failure
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should address their respective concerns in a more constructive
manner. For example, the U.S. should show more appreciation for
what China has accomplished thus far in stemming the tide of pirated
U.S. intellectual property. On the other end, China should work
toward establishing better enforcement mechanisms and educating the
Chinese people on the importance of the protection of intellectual
property. Otherwise, the foreign investment that China desires from
the U.S. will be curtailed.
These changes in attitude and action will not occur overnight. Nor
will they happen through America's strong-arm tactics, such as
Special 301. Instead, change will be a gradual and somewhat painful
process for both China and the U.S. as they attempt to fashion a trade
relationship that is mutually beneficial to both countries.

to do more to protect U.S.-owned intellectual property; and U.S. visits by
highly visible Chinese delegations to the United States and U.S. missions to
China to secure Chinese purchases of U.S. products.
Jacques deLisle, Of Chinese Walls, Battering Rams, and Building Permits: Five Lessons
About InternationalEconomic Law from Sino-U.S. Trade and Investment Relations, 17 U. PA.
J. INT'L ECON. L. 513, 518-19 (1996).

